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INTRODUCTION
In a 1962 speech addressing the protection of consumer interests,
President John F. Kennedy stated, “All of us are consumers. All of
us deserve the right to be protected against fraudulent or mislead-
ing advertisements and labels.”1 With his administration’s consumer
rights legislation promoting fair packaging and labeling, changes to
testing for prescription drugs, regulations for new food additives and
food supplements, and required performance testing of household
appliances, President Kennedy has been credited with being on the
forefront of consumer advocacy in the 1960s.2 However, since the
1960s, consumer advocacy has drastically changed. Nowadays, even
the Kennedy Administration would likely be surprised at the ability
of modern consumer protection laws to target a new industry
altogether: therapies that claim to be able to alter a person’s sexual
orientation.
While such therapies were evidently not a cornerstone of early
consumer law legislation, plaintiffs have recently begun exploring
the ability to challenge groups that provide sexual orientation
change efforts (SOCE) through consumer protection laws.3 Under
consumer protection laws, plaintiffs may generally allege that ad-
vertisements and promises of a change in sexual orientation from
SOCE practitioners constitute deceptive business transactions or
trade practices.4 In fact, plaintiffs have had success with this line of
legal action. In New Jersey, a jury found for the plaintiffs in
Ferguson v. JONAH and determined that, under state consumer
protection law, SOCE practitioners were liable for damages incurred
1. President John F. Kennedy, Special Message to Congress on Protecting the Consumer
Interest 1 (Mar. 15, 1962), https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-037-028
[https://perma.cc/NR87-M84F].
2. See Robert J. Lampman & Robin A. Douthitt, The Consumer Bill of Rights: Thirty-Five
Years Later, ADVANCING CONSUMER INT., Fall 1997, at 4, 5.
3. See Olga Khazan, Can Sexuality Be Changed?, ATLANTIC (June 3, 2015), http://www.
theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/06/can-sexuality-be-changed/394490/ [https://perma.cc/
A2PV-LBWL]; Charles Pulliam-Moore, These LGBT Groups Are Trying to Shut Down this
Virginia Gay Conversion Camp, FUSION (Feb. 25, 2016, 12:32 PM), http://fusion.net/story/
273250/virginia-gay-conversion-therapy-ftc/ [https://perma.cc/59CE-2752].
4. Consumer Protection, 27 BUS. TORTS REP. 133, 133-34 (2015).
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by patients that underwent the practitioner-provided SOCE.5 The
defendant, Jews Offering New Alternatives for Healing (JONAH),
was a conversion therapy group, and the plaintiffs were former
JONAH clients who asserted that JONAH failed to fulfill its prom-
ises to change their sexual orientations.6
At the heart of Ferguson v. JONAH was a consumer-business
transaction. JONAH offered conversion therapy sessions and coun-
seling services with the claim that participation in such activities
would alter participants’ sexual orientations and rid them of same-
sex attraction.7 The cost of JONAH’s services varied, with group ses-
sions costing $60 and individual sessions costing $100.8 The paid-for
therapy and counseling sessions consisted of a variety of different
SOCE.9 Group sessions were often elaborate activities with aspects
that involved the plaintiffs standing naked in a circle with other
young men, reenacting scenes of past sexual abuse, and being
taunted with homophobic slurs.10 Individual sessions were coun-
seling-based and involved counselors advising the plaintiffs to
complete a variety of activities to combat same-sex attraction.11 The
suggested activities included spending more time at the gym, vis-
iting bathhouses with their fathers, and wearing a rubber band on
the wrist and snapping it when feeling attracted to another man.12
One individual session involved a therapist instructing one of the
plaintiffs to beat an effigy that represented his mother while
screaming, as if killing her.13
The jury in Ferguson v. JONAH determined that the consumer-
business transactions involving the aforementioned SOCE violated
New Jersey consumer protection law.14 The case was the first of its
5. See Olga Khazan, The End of Gay Conversion Therapy, ATLANTIC (June 26, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/06/the-end-of-gay-conversion-therapy/396953/
[https://perma.cc/DRA2-5R8A].
6. Id.
7. Ferguson v. JONAH, No. HUD-L-5473-12, 2015 WL 609436, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. Feb. 5, 2015).
8. See id. at *2.
9. See id. at *1-2. 
10. See id.
11. See id. 
12. See id. 
13. See id. at *2. 
14. See Khazan, supra note 5. 
644 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:641
kind in the United States,15 and the aftermath of the case resulted
in JONAH ceasing SOCE services for good.16 Although anti-SOCE
activists seemed invigorated by the decision,17 the success of the
plaintiffs in Ferguson v. JONAH raises further questions, with
perhaps the most succinct question being: Is Ferguson v. JONAH a
one-time case or a sign of things to come? 
Some academic legal literature has discussed the intersection of
consumer protection law and SOCE. While Ferguson v. JONAH was
developing, one legal scholar advocated for plaintiffs to target SOCE
through antideception statutes, including consumer protection
laws.18 In the wake of the Ferguson v. JONAH jury verdict, another
legal scholar has argued that the case represents the beginning of
the end for SOCE practitioners.19 Yet another has argued that con-
sumer protection litigation against SOCE may improve the quality
and acceptability of care for lesbian, gay, and bisexual health
rights.20 However, this Note is distinguishable from other work on
the intersection of consumer protection and SOCE because it
accounts for the high likelihood of SOCE practitioners adapting the
representation of their practices to limit liability under consumer
protection laws.21 While this Note argues that consumer protection
laws are generally capable of holding practitioners liable for the
harm caused by their SOCE practices,22 major weaknesses exist
within state consumer protection laws that frustrate the ability to
15. See Consumer Protection, supra note 4, at 133.
16. Judge Orders New Jersey “Gay Conversion” Nonprofit to Close, CBS NEWS (Dec.
18, 2015, 7:19 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/judge-orders-new-jersey-gay-conversion-
therapy-nonprofit-to-close/ [https://perma.cc/V5EE-CBFX].
17. See Stephen Peters, Huge Legal Victory: New Jersey Jury Finds That Anti-LGBT
Conversion Therapy Is Fraud, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (June 25, 2015), https://www.hrc.org/blog/
huge-legal-victory-jury-finds-that-anti-lgbt-conversion-therapy-is-fraud [https://perma.cc/
TZ8T-ANF8].
18. See Jacob M. Victor, Note, Regulating Sexual Orientation Change Efforts: The
California Approach, Its Limitations, and Potential Alternatives, 123 YALE L.J. 1532, 1564
(2014). 
19. See Peter R. Dubrowski, The Ferguson v. JONAH Verdict and a Path Towards
National Cessation of Gay-to-Straight “Conversion Therapy,” 110 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 77,
79 (2015).
20. Melissa Ballengee Alexander, Victim to Victor: A Right to Health Perspective on
Ferguson v. JONAH, LESBIAN GAY BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER ISSUES PHILOSOPHY (Am.
Philosophical Ass’n, Newark, Del.), Spring 2016, at 1, 4.
21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Part I.C.
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ensure that SOCE practitioners are liable for deceptive trade
practices.23 Therefore, this Note focuses on the concept of deceptive-
ness, and predicts that SOCE practitioners will learn from Ferguson
v. JONAH and attempt to avoid their services being labeled as
“deceptive” under state consumer protection laws.24
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background on
consumer protection law, details a brief history of SOCE, and
explains why consumer protection laws provide an attractive oppor-
tunity to discredit SOCE. Part II explains the two core representa-
tions determined to be deceptive and in violation of consumer
protection law in Ferguson v. JONAH. Part II then explains how
SOCE practitioners will likely adapt the representation of their
services to prevent them from being labeled as deceptive trade
practices. Part III accounts for varying state consumer protection
claim elements, and details how certain jurisdictions have require-
ments that would complicate SOCE claims. Part IV considers what
defenses are likely to be raised by defendants, particularly involving
First Amendment protections. This Note concludes by arguing that
while Ferguson v. JONAH may be replicated nationwide, consumer
protection laws will not be able to completely eradicate SOCE
because SOCE practitioners still have viable ways to continue
providing SOCE.
I. THE NEXUS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION AND SOCE
Before delving into the particularized legal aspects of consumer
protection claims against SOCE, it is important to understand the
basics of consumer protection law, the history of SOCE, and the
motivations for eradicating SOCE practices. In this Part, Section A
lays out the basic history and purpose of consumer protection law.
Section B describes SOCE, including information about the prac-
tice’s harmful impacts as well as details regarding the recent
legislative movement to eliminate SOCE. Importantly, Section C ex-
plains why taking action through consumer protection laws serves
as an attractive alternative to other efforts against SOCE.
23. See infra Part III.D.
24. For information on consumer protection laws’ focus on deceptiveness, see infra text
accompanying notes 37, 105-07.
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A. The Basics of Consumer Protection Laws
As the name suggests, consumer protection laws serve to protect
consumers from harmful business practices they may encounter
when engaging in the open market.25 A typical consumer protection
law may prohibit businesses from partaking in unfair or unconscio-
nable practices, but all consumer protection laws prohibit “decep-
tive” practices.26 Consumer protection laws have been described as
“a complex combination of state and federal statutes, [with] private
and public enforcement,”27 and the antideception aspects of con-
sumer protection law certainly match such a description.28
1. Common Law Origins
Predating consumer protection laws, the common law action for
fraud or misrepresentation embodies the early legal framework pro-
hibiting deception. Common law fraud or misrepresentation can be
summarized as having five distinct elements.29 A plaintiff in a com-
mon law fraud or misrepresentation case must prove that the de-
fendant: “(1) made a false representation of a material fact; (2) knew
or believed that the representation was false, or had an insufficient
basis of information for making the representation (scienter); and
(3) intended to induce the plaintiff to act in reliance on the represen-
tation.”30 Additionally, the plaintiff must prove that he or she: (4)
“actually relied on the representation in a manner justifiable under
the circumstances” and (5) “suffered damage as a result of such
reliance.”31
25. See CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE
STATES: A 50-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES 5-6
(2009).
26. Id. at 5.
27. DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW § 1:1,
Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2015).
28. For a recently updated compilation of the various aspects of state consumer protection
laws, see Dubrowski, supra note 19, app. at 100-17.
29. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 27, § 2:2.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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Originally, U.S. law was not amenable to accusations of fraud or
misrepresentation in the business sphere.32 Early law maintained
implicit distinctions between ethics in business and ethics in other
spheres of life, allowing greater leeway for businessmen to make
commercial misrepresentations without suffering significant legal
consequences.33 As business transactions and tort law became more
complex, early twentieth-century judges expanded the broadened
theories of negligence into business transactions through the doc-
trine of misrepresentation.34 
While common law fraud still remains an option for consumer-
plaintiffs, the common law requirements—specifically those of in-
tent and scienter—have been particularly difficult for consumers to
prove.35 Coupled with the general tort rule that attorneys’ fees are
generally not recoverable for plaintiffs, common law actions of fraud
and misrepresentation left consumers “with little in the way of
effective relief.”36 However, consumer law eventually grew in two
different areas outside of common law to make fraud suits more
favorable for the consumer: within the regulations of the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) and within state consumer protection
laws.
2. Federal Consumer Protection Law and Subsequent State
Adoption
The FTC was the first federal agency to lead the charge against
deceptive business practices, defining a deceptive act as one that is
“misleading in a material respect.”37 Established in 1914 to combat
32. See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 130-31
(1980).
33. See id. at 131.
34. Id. 
35. See PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 27, § 2:9. In fact, at least one state court has
held that proving a prima facie common law fraud claim also establishes a valid case under
consumer protection law. See Buechin v. Ogden Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 511 N.E.2d 1330,
1337-38 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
36. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 27, § 2:9.
37. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION (Oct. 14, 1983), https:
//www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/410531/831014deceptionstmt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/37SM-WTB5].
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unfair methods of competition,38 the FTC has served as a model for
all state consumer protection efforts.39 In the wake of the 1960s con-
sumer movement, the FTC encouraged states to become active
participants in consumer protection and adopt their own statutes
against unfair and deceptive business practices.40 When states
adopted their own consumer protection laws, they either based their
laws on FTC law or on model uniform legislation.41 The FTC en-
couragement for state-level laws was important because deceptive
consumer practices of small, locally owned companies would be
overlooked if all enforcement actions could only be taken up through
the federal agency.42 The federal government did not expect to be
able to enforce the “myriad” of deceptive practices by smaller com-
panies, and the FTC instead focused on more wide-spread deceptive
practices.43
The crucial difference between federal and state consumer pro-
tection law is that almost all states allow consumers to bring private
actions against deceptive business acts, whereas the FTC does not
allow private actions.44 Thus, a consumer-plaintiff need not rely on
government approval of their case to file a claim.45 While the FTC
is theoretically able to initiate action against SOCE practitioners for
deceptive practices,46 the FTC has not become significantly involved
in the regulation of local activities.47 Prominent consumer law
scholars Dee Pridgen and Richard M. Alderman theorize two
38. See Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of Consumer
Protection Acts, 54 KAN. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005).
39. LEE E. NORRGARD & JULIA M. NORRGARD, CONSUMER FRAUD: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK
9 (1998).
40. See J.R. Franke & D.A. Ballam, New Applications of Consumer Protection Law:
Judicial Activism or Legislative Directive?, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 347, 357 (1992). State
consumer protection laws are often referred to as Uniform and Deceptive Acts and Practices
(UDAP) laws. See CARTER, supra note 25, at 5. 
41. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 38, at 15.
42. See PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 27, § 2:9. 
43. See id.
44. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 38, at 3, 15-16. 
45. Such advantages, however, do not exist in every state. See infra Part III.D.
46. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L.
No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012)) (broadening
the FTC’s authority by striking out “in commerce” and amending to “in or affecting com-
merce”). 
47. See PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 27, § 8:6. 
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reasons for the FTC’s lack of presence in the local marketplace.48
First, the strength of state consumer protection agencies make
federal intervention unnecessary.49 Second, the FTC is hesitant to
extend its jurisdictional reach to the local level because it is still
required to justify its jurisdiction under the statutory definition of
“commerce.”50 While the FTC’s authority over individual defendants
largely depends on the scope of the particular practitioner’s adver-
tising and practices, state consumer laws apply against any trade
or commerce offered within a state’s borders.51
Despite consumer protection law existing in some form through-
out the entirety of the twentieth century, consumer-plaintiffs did
not first utilize consumer protection claims against SOCE until Fer-
guson v. JONAH was filed in 2012.52 It is necessary to consider the
history of SOCE in order to understand how SOCE practices went
from being generally supported to being generally disregarded.
B. Understanding the History of SOCE
Existing for well over a century,53 SOCE practices have been of-
fered as reparative measures for individuals who identify as lesbian,
gay, or bisexual, or are looking to rid themselves of feelings of same-
sex attraction.54 Historically, SOCE services have ranged from
48. See id.
49. See id. 
50. See id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 44 (2012) (“‘Commerce’ means commerce among the
several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the
District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and another, or between any such Terri-
tory and any State or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and any State or
Territory or foreign nation.”).
51. See PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 27, § 4:1.
52. See Ferguson v. JONAH, No. HUD-L-5473-12, 2015 WL 609436, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. Feb. 5, 2015). 
53. See Douglas C. Haldeman, The Practice and Ethics of Sexual Orientation Conversion
Therapy, 62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 221, 221 (1994). For an in-depth history that
separates SOCE into three distinct eras, see Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 789-
803 (2002).
54. See David B. Cruz, Controlling Desires: Sexual Orientation Conversion and the Limits
of Knowledge and Law, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1297, 1300 (1999). For an understanding of the diffi-
culty behind defining sexual orientation, see Ritch C. Savin-Williams, How Many Gays Are
There? It Depends, in CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON LESBIAN, GAY, AND BISEXUAL IDENTI-
TIES 5, 6-7 (Debra A. Hope ed., 2009). This Note limits its scope to change efforts for gay,
lesbian, and bisexual persons that focus on sexual orientation. This Note does not explore the
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medical (drug treatment, hormones, and surgery) to psychothera-
peutic (electric shock and psychoanalytic therapy) to behavioral
(rest, masturbatory reconditioning, visits to prostitutes, and
excessive bicycle riding) to religious (prayer and spiritual interven-
tion).55 Even when the American Psychological Association (APA)
decided to remove homosexuality from its list of diagnosable mental
disorders in the 1970s,56 SOCE practitioners promising a cure for
same-sex attractions continued to offer their services, with SOCE
being advertised as supportive and helpful to those wanting to
eliminate same-sex attractions.57 Despite the continued availability
of practitioner-provided SOCE, individuals began to study and
critique SOCE—first with early challenges to SOCE effectiveness,58
and second with movements to explicitly ban SOCE altogether.59
1. Some Early Challenges to SOCE
After a period of acceptance, SOCE began to face accusations for
being ineffective in changing sexual orientation, or at the very least,
being unable to produce results that proved a true change. Through-
out the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, SOCE practitioners were able to
point to detailed scientific studies that claimed that altering pa-
tients’ sexual orientation was possible.60 However, by the 1990s,
psychologists began to doubt previous sexual orientation conversion
studies. Psychologist Douglas C. Haldeman claimed that definitions
of sexuality “based solely on behavior” led to “deficient and mislead-
ing” results when studying sexual orientation.61 Haldeman further
critiqued psychological and religious-based conversion programs for
reporting their results on a behavioral definition of sexual orienta-
tion and for not truly being able to prove their patients emerged
therapies that are unique to transgender issues, such as sex reassignment therapy. For
background information on therapies focusing on gender identity, see NICHOLAS M. TEICH,
TRANSGENDER 101: A SIMPLE GUIDE TO A COMPLEX ISSUE 45-61 (2012).
55. See Haldeman, supra note 53, at 221. SOCE from Ferguson v. JONAH focused mainly
on behavioral and spiritual means. See supra text accompanying notes 9-13. 
56. See Cruz, supra note 54, at 1300.
57. See Yoshino, supra note 53, at 799.
58. See infra Part I.B.1. 
59. See infra Part I.B.2.
60. See Haldeman, supra note 53, at 222-23.
61. Id. at 221.
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from treatment completely rid of all feelings of same-sex attrac-
tion.62
Along with doubts regarding the effectiveness of SOCE, viable
evidence that such therapies were truly harmful to patients began
to emerge. Haldeman’s 1992 article acknowledged that former
SOCE patients later “become shamed, conflicted, and fearful about
their homoerotic feelings” and “report increased guilt, anxiety, and
low self-esteem.”63 Although the lack of data forced Haldeman to
stop short of explicitly describing SOCE as harmful,64 the APA
issued a statement in 1998 opposing any psychiatric treatment that
assumed homosexuality was a mental disorder—including repara-
tive or conversion therapy—because such treatment risked depres-
sion, anxiety, and self-destructive behavior.65 The APA statement
also validated Haldeman’s critique against the effectiveness of
SOCE, as the statement acknowledged that no scientifically sound
evidence existed that sexual orientation can be changed.66
Despite statements from major professional organizations, like
the APA, declaring that SOCE practices were harmful and ineffec-
tive, not all mental health care professionals agreed with the APA’s
determinations. Psychiatric studies of SOCE that occurred after the
APA’s statements garnered results that rebutted presumptions of
ineffectiveness and harmfulness.67 One notable study by Robert L.
Spitzer, a psychiatrist who led the effort to declassify homosexuality
as a disorder in the 1970s, found that highly motivated SOCE
patients were able to achieve “heterosexual functioning,” or at least
significantly decrease their levels of same-sex attraction.68 Spitzer’s
study further found that SOCE helped patients overcome feelings
of depression by the end of their treatments, contrary to the idea
62. See id. at 224-25.
63. Id. at 225.
64. See id. (“‘What harm has been done in the name of sexual reorientation?’ At present,
no data are extant.”).
65. Nancy A. Del Pizzo, If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It: Condemning Promises to ‘Straighten’
Homosexuals for a Fee, N.J. LAW., June 2013, at 6, 6.
66. See id.
67. See A. Dean Byrd, Homosexuality: Innate and Immutable? What Science Can and
Cannot Say, 4 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 479, 498 (2010).
68. See id.; Gabriel Arana, My So-Called Ex-Gay Life, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 11, 2012),
http://prospect.org/article/my-so-called-ex-gay-life [https://perma.cc/2FKQ-WJYR].
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that SOCE were harmful.69 Studies such as Spitzer’s were contro-
versial for cutting against the APA’s determinations on sexual ori-
entation conversion,70 but such controversy illustrated the staying
power of ideas that sexual orientation could be treated and changed
despite the opposing determinations by leading professional groups
like the APA.71
2. The Tide Turns Against SOCE
With competing studies regarding the true impact of SOCE, and
the APA’s determinations alone not being enough to eliminate
SOCE, a clear desire emerged among gay, lesbian, and bisexual acti-
vists and supporters to eliminate—or at the very least reduce—
SOCE practices across the nation.72 Legislative efforts against
SOCE on both the state and federal levels met varying degrees of
success.73 The major success has come in the form of laws that ban
SOCE for minors.74 California, Illinois, New Jersey, Oregon, and the
District of Columbia have each passed laws that ban minors from
undergoing SOCE.75 These legislative successes largely derive from
the states justifying their decisions in the name of protecting
69. See Byrd, supra note 67, at 498.
70. See id. Notably, Spitzer has attempted to retract his study that claimed that highly
motivated individuals could achieve a change in sexual orientation. See Arana, supra note 68;
see also Benedict Carey, Psychiatry Giant Sorry for Backing Gay ‘Cure,’ N.Y. TIMES (May
18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/19/health/dr-robert-l-spitzer-noted-psychiatrist-
apologizes-for-study-on-gay-cure.html [https://perma.cc/5Z53-K79N].
71. While perhaps the most prominent, Spitzer’s study has not been the only scientific
study to suggest the ability of a person to alter his or her sexual orientation. See, e.g., A. Dean
Byrd et al., Clients’ Perceptions of How Reorientation Therapy and Self-Help Can Promote
Changes in Sexual Orientation, 102 PSYCHOL. REP. 3, 4 (2008).
72. See Khazan, supra note 5 (quoting the plaintiffs’ attorney in Ferguson v. JONAH as
saying that “[c]onversion therapy and homophobia are based on the same central lie—that gay
people are broken and need to be fixed”).
73. Tiffany Lo, Innate, Not Immoral, BERKELEY POL. REV. (May 10, 2016), https://bpr.
berkeley.edu/2016/05/10/innate-not-immoral/ [https://perma.cc/DG8Y-U8BL].
74. See id.
75. See Peters, supra note 17. For an example of a statute banning SOCE for minors, see
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 865-865.2 (West 2016). While a law has not been passed through
the legislature, New York’s governor implemented state regulations that severely limit the
availability of SOCE to minors. See Jennifer Peltz, N.Y. Governor: It’s Time to Ban Conversion
Therapy, USA TODAY (Feb. 7, 2016, 2:03 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2016/02/07/ny-governor-s-time-ban-conversion-therapy/79962790/ [https://perma.cc/WK8J-
3S4U].
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minors.76 For instance, as the first state to ban SOCE for minors,
California’s legislature claimed the law was justified by the state’s
compelling interest to protect the physical and psychological well-
being of minors by limiting exposure to the harms of SOCE.77 Two
federal circuit courts have upheld these SOCE bans for minors
despite accusations that the laws unconstitutionally hinder the
First Amendment rights of SOCE practitioners, potential SOCE
patients, and the potential patients’ parents.78 Thus, for the time
being, the laws banning SOCE for minors seem to be here to stay.
The concern for the well-being of minors, however, has not been
enough to result in a successful limitation of SOCE practices. In
fact, while four states and the District of Columbia have enacted
SOCE bans for minors, seventeen other states have seen similar
proposals stall during the legislative process or fail outright.79 The
bills have failed for different reasons. In Colorado and Hawaii, bills
banning SOCE for minors died in committee due to lack of support.80
In Maryland, the sponsoring state legislator withdrew the bill,
citing anti-SOCE advocates’ desires to pursue regulatory changes
within state health boards and forgo legislative action.81 Even where
the bills are still traversing the state legislatures, there is not
necessarily reason for optimism among anti-SOCE advocates. For
example, despite the Texas legislature considering a bill banning
conversion therapy for minors, the Texas Republican Party endorsed
76. See, e.g., 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 48/5(13) (2016); Alison S. Bohm et al., Challenges
Facing LGBT Youth, 17 GEO. J. GENDER & LAW 125, 157-58 (2016).
77. See Victor, supra note 18, at 1535.
78. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Governor of N.J., 783 F.3d 150, 151 (3d Cir. 2015); King v.
Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 220 (3d Cir. 2014); Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1221-22
(9th Cir. 2013).
79. See Margaret Hartmann, Where the States Stand in the Fight to Ban Gay Conversion
Therapy, N.Y. MAG.: DAILY INTELLIGENCER (Apr. 9, 2015, 5:05 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/
intelligencer/2015/04/where-the-states-stand-on-gay-conversion-therapy.html [https://perma.
cc/KZK9-R8ZA] (reporting that legislation banning SOCE for minors has been introduced in
Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, and Vermont, while similar legislation has failed in
Colorado, Hawaii, Maryland, and Virginia).
80. See id. 
81. See Kevin Rector, Gay ‘Conversion Therapy’ Bill Withdrawn as Advocates Pursue
Regulatory Oversight, BALT. SUN (Mar. 14, 2014, 6:54 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/
features/gay-in-maryland/gay-matters/bs-gm-gay-conversion-therapy-bill-withdrawn-201403
14-story.html [https://perma.cc/EMQ7-3CNS].
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“reparative therapy” in 2014.82 The state party’s official position will
likely serve as a major hurdle in getting the bill passed.
Further, no state has come close to installing a complete, explicit,
and outright ban on SOCE for all potential patients.83 There have
been multiple attempts on the federal level to make SOCE practices
unlawful nationwide, and actions have ranged from proposed fed-
eral laws banning SOCE to calls for administrative investigations
into SOCE practices.84 Most recently, Representative Ted Lieu
introduced the Therapeutic Fraud Prevention Act in the 114th Con-
gress.85 This Act would amend the practices of the FTC and formally
recognize conversion therapy as an illegal, deceptive practice.86
However, the Therapeutic Fraud Prevention Act has stalled in the
House of Representatives and has not been signed into law.87
Although the attempts nationwide have focused on more than just
banning SOCE therapies for minors, the federal efforts have not
seen any successes or concrete policies created. As a result, a variety
of organizations offering or promoting SOCE still exist today.88
To summarize this brief history of SOCE, two points are most
important. First, SOCE practices have been doubted and challenged
as both ineffective and harmful to SOCE patients, despite SOCE
practitioners advertising their services otherwise. Second, both state
and federal actors have taken steps to limit the pervasiveness of
SOCE in order to protect their citizens, yet they have been unable
82. See Hartmann, supra note 79.
83. See id.
84. See Press Release, Representative Ted Lieu, Congressman Lieu Announces Therapeu-
tic Fraud Prevention Act (May 19, 2015) [hereinafter Lieu Press Release], https://lieu.house.
gov/media-center/press-releases/congressman-lieu-announces-therapeutic-fraud-prevention-
act [https://perma.cc/C5HL-87AZ]; Press Release, Representative Jackie Speier, Congress-
woman Speier Demands FTC Investigation of “Gay Conversion Therapy” Practices (May 13,
2015), https://speier.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/congresswoman-speier-demands-
ftc-investigation-gay-conversion-therapy [https://perma.cc/C4BN-FRPC]. 
85. See Lieu Press Release, supra note 84.
86. See id. For information on the FTC’s role in antideception consumer protection, see
supra text accompanying notes 37-43, 46-51. 
87. See Therapeutic Fraud Prevention Act, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/
resources/therapeutic-fraud-prevention-act [https://perma.cc/JZ5C-J8GW] (last updated Mar.
11, 2016).
88. See, e.g., Ministry in Action, ONE BY ONE, http://www.oneby1.org/ [https://perma.cc/
8PR3-DWQQ]; PATH: POSITIVE APPROACHES TO HEALTHY SEXUALITY, http://www.pathinfo.org/
[https://perma.cc/QX8G-7PS7]; PEOPLE CAN CHANGE, http://www.peoplecanchange.com/
[https://perma.cc/5DTX-AEQB].
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to enact new, far-reaching legislation to explicitly ban SOCE. With
these two points in mind, this Note turns to explaining why state
consumer protection law functions as an attractive means for plain-
tiffs to challenge SOCE.
C. Reasons to Combat SOCE with State Consumer Protection Law
While various other legal claims potentially exist that allow form-
er SOCE patients to bring suit against SOCE practitioners,89
consumer protection actions represent a unique opportunity for a
plaintiff wishing to make a statement against SOCE practices.
Consumer protection actions are a desirable pathway for former
SOCE patients for a variety of reasons. First, the necessary laws to
bring suit against SOCE practitioners already exist as state
consumer protection laws and require no new approval by legisla-
tors.90 Second, state consumer protection actions are available to
any consumer-plaintiff in almost every state, whereas current anti-
SOCE laws only aim to protect minors.91 Third, a slew of consumer
protection cases accusing SOCE practitioners of deceptive business
practices will generate a negative image of the industry and help to
delegitimize it.92
First, despite the challenges in passing explicit SOCE bans that
protect individuals from being harmed by SOCE in the first place,93
all fifty states may already have a viable course for individuals that
have already suffered harm by SOCE. After all, all fifty states and
the District of Columbia have some type of consumer protection
laws that both the state attorney general and private lawsuits have
89. See Laura A. Gans, Inverts, Perverts, and Converts: Sexual Orientation Conversion
Therapy and Liability, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 219, 232-49 (1999) (exploring various tort claims
against SOCE practitioners); Arcangelo S. Cella, Note and Comment, A Voice in the Room:
The Function of State Legislative Bans on Sexual Orientation Change Efforts for Minors, 40
AM. J.L. & MED. 113, 131-36 (2014) (exploring professional negligence against SOCE prac-
titioners); Karolyn Ann Hicks, Comment, “Reparative” Therapy: Whether Parental Attempts
to Change a Child’s Sexual Orientation Can Legally Constitute Child Abuse, 49 AM. U. L. REV.
505, 510 (1999) (recommending that SOCE be interpreted as child abuse); Victor, supra note
18, at 1563 n.134 (suggesting that sexual harassment law could provide relief for former
SOCE patients).
90. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 74-78.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 99-102.
93. See supra Part I.B. 
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enforced.94 As stated above, due to the ability for private plaintiffs
to bring consumer protection actions,95 state laws are more amena-
ble to consumers than federal law.96 The intricacies of these laws are
explained and discussed later in this Note,97 but merely knowing
consumer protection laws are available in every state is an impor-
tant factor in establishing the viability of consumer protection
claims against SOCE. Additionally, with Ferguson v. JONAH suc-
cessfully utilizing New Jersey consumer protection law, state law
clearly has both the capability and momentum to be a successful
basis for consumer protection claims against SOCE.
Second, because successful legislation against SOCE has been
limited to banning the services for minors, challenging SOCE with
consumer protection laws would fill in the gaps because any plain-
tiff, regardless of age, would be able to bring a suit against a SOCE
practitioner.98 Therefore, whether legislative action against SOCE
succeeds in states is largely unimportant because plaintiffs can take
advantage of existing consumer protection laws to receive damages
for being subject to SOCE practitioners’ deceptive business prac-
tices.
Third, gay, lesbian, and bisexual activists have consistently used
courts to shift public opinion in their favor.99 Courts finding SOCE
practitioners liable for violating consumer protection laws would
assist in delegitimizing their SOCE practices to the public because
a reputation for fraud and deception in any industry would be harm-
ful in continuing business operations.100 Such negative publicity
would assist SOCE’s opponents’ goals in two ways. First, the threat
94. See, e.g., D.C. CODE §§ 28-3901 to -3913 (2016); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-201, 59.1-204
(2016).
95. For difficulties in states that do not allow private consumer actions against deceptive
business actions, see infra Part III.D.
96. However, plaintiffs are beginning to test the strength of FTC claims against SOCE.
See Pulliam-Moore, supra note 3. 
97. See infra Parts II-III.
98. See Alexander, supra note 20, at 3, 5 n.23.
99. See Michael E. Waterstone, The Costs of Easy Victory, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587,
600-01 (2015).
100. See, e.g., Ackerman v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 172 F.3d 467, 469 (7th Cir. 1999)
(“[P]ublic charges of fraud can do great harm to the reputation of a business firm or other en
terprise (or individual).”); see also Christopher M. Fairman, An Invitation to the Rulemakers—
Strike Rule 9(b), 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 291-93 (2004) (describing how heightened pleading
requirements for fraud are designed to protect defendants’ reputations).
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of reputation-damaging litigation would dissuade practitioners from
involving themselves in SOCE in the first place. This phenomenon
would, in effect, create some pre-action protection for potential
SOCE patients. Second, public opinion shifting farther against
SOCE may impact the application of other laws. For instance, many
state laws prohibit mental health professionals from making
deceptive claims.101 Favorable court determinations showing that
providing SOCE is a deceptive practice under consumer protection
laws would also likely allow SOCE practitioners to be held liable
under laws that regulate licensed professionals.102 Thus, the success
of consumer protection actions against SOCE practitioners can pave
the way for other antideception laws to be utilized to limit the
practice of SOCE.
One disadvantage to state consumer protection laws that may
limit the ability of consumer-plaintiffs to bring suits is the handling
of attorneys’ fees. Arizona, Delaware, Mississippi, South Dakota,
and Wyoming do not allow plaintiffs to collect attorneys’ fees when
bringing consumer protection claims, while North Dakota and Ohio
only allow plaintiffs to collect attorneys’ fees if the defendants are
proven to knowingly violate the consumer protection law.103 The
inability to ensure that attorneys’ fees will be paid certainly
weakens the likelihood that attorneys will take up lengthy and
difficult consumer protection cases in the first place. In such cases,
plaintiffs may need to rely on pro bono attorneys or nonprofit legal
organizations.104
II. CLASSIFYING SOCE REPRESENTATIONS AS DECEPTIVE TRADE
PRACTICES
As described in Part I, many benefits exist in bringing a consumer
protection claim against a SOCE practitioner. However, in order to
bring the claim, the consumer-plaintiff must be able to prove that
the SOCE representations involved were deceptive trade practices.
101. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 651 (West 2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-21 (West
2016); see also Victor, supra note 18, at 1568-69 (describing California’s prohibition of de-
ceptive acts by licensed therapists).
102. See Victor, supra note 18, at 1537.
103. See Dubrowski, supra note 19, at 96.
104. See id. at 96 n.96.
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Generally, an affirmative misrepresentation of fact will classify a
trade practice as deceptive, so long as that misrepresentation is
false or misleading.105 While some states prohibit only a closed list
of specific deceptive acts in their statutes,106 state courts have ac-
knowledged that consumer protection laws should be interpreted in
light of their broad legislative purpose to provide relief from decep-
tive trade practices, allowing even numerated lists to be considered
broadly.107
Importantly, though, SOCE can exist in a wide variety of ways,
and Ferguson v. JONAH’s theory of deception was successful under
a particular set of facts. In light of Ferguson v. JONAH, SOCE
practitioners will likely adapt their advertising and services in order
to continue to offer SOCE. To be sure, SOCE practitioners have
already displayed a willingness to change the way they represent
SOCE, as JONAH changed the meaning behind its titular acronym
from “Jews Offering New Alternatives for Homosexuality” to “Jews
Offering New Alternatives for Healing” once legal action against the
group began.108 While speculative, this Part addresses the two core
representations the New Jersey Superior Court found to be decep-
tive in Ferguson v. JONAH and explains how SOCE practitioners
will likely alter their practices to avoid liability under consumer
protection law. As seen in Ferguson v. JONAH, two common accusa-
tions of misrepresentation will likely involve a practitioner’s asser-
tion that homosexuality is a disorder or that sexual orientation is
alterable.109
105. See, e.g., Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 677 N.W.2d 233, 245 (Wis. 2004). Some
states allow an omission of material facts to qualify as a deceptive trade practice. See PRIDGEN
& ALDERMAN, supra note 27, § 3:7.
106. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-105 (2016); IND. CODE § 24-5-0.5-3 (2016); OR. REV.
STAT. § 646.608 (2016); CARTER, supra note 25, at 11.
107. See Denson v. Ron Tonkin Gran Turismo, Inc., 566 P.2d 1177, 1179 n.4 (Or. 1977);
Nienke v. Naiman Grp., Ltd., 857 P.2d 446, 450 (Colo. App. 1992). 
108. See Victor, supra note 18, at 1534 n.7.
109. See Ferguson v. JONAH, No. HUD-L-5473-12, 2015 WL 609436, at *10 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. Feb. 5, 2015); Dubrowski, supra note 19, at 81-83. For a brief discussion on how
informed consent may absolve SOCE practitioners of being accused of misrepresentation at
all, see Alexander, supra note 20, at 4.
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A. Homosexuality as a Disorder
Despite the APA determining otherwise, some have still main-
tained that a nonheterosexual sexual orientation is a disorder
requiring a cure.110 Ferguson v. JONAH serves as a useful example
of how SOCE services can qualify as deceptive trade practices when
practitioner-defendants misrepresent homosexuality as a disorder
or illness. The examination of expert qualifications in preparation
for the Ferguson v. JONAH trial illustrates how courts may no
longer be able to admit evidence that homosexuality is a disorder.
In Ferguson v. JONAH, the consumer-plaintiffs moved to bar the
testimony of six defense experts, asserting there was no reliable
foundation for the experts’ testimony that homosexuality is a
disorder.111 In response, the practitioner-defendants argued that
their experts’ opinions classifying homosexuality as a disorder were
legitimate and scientifically based.112
The New Jersey Superior Court found that “the generally
accepted scientific theory is that homosexuality is not a mental
disorder and not abnormal.”113 In its decision evaluating the
eligibility of JONAH’s experts for testimony, the Superior Court
weighed arguments by both the consumer-plaintiffs and
practitioner-defendants and the importance of the APA removing
homosexuality from its list of mental disorders, officially titled the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).114
The Superior Court acknowledged that the APA’s DSM was
“unquestionably authoritative in the mental health field” and that
New Jersey courts have repeatedly found general acceptance of the
DSM as beyond dispute.115 Further, the APA’s determination had
been embraced by other health organizations.116 Acknowledging that
general acceptance is not dispositive, the court noted that general
acceptance constitutes a strong and perhaps conclusive indication
110. See Byrd, supra note 67, at 480.
111. See Ferguson, 2015 WL 609436, at *1, *13-14.
112. See id. at *5. 
113. Id. at *9.
114. See id. at *4, *6-10.
115. See id. at *7. 
116. See id. at *8.
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of the reliability of the results.117 Evidence of a minority view did not
deter the court from finding general acceptance in the scientific
community that aligned with the APA’s DSM; the court held that
JONAH’s experts’ testimony was inadmissible.118 The court clearly
stated that JONAH’s “experts base their conclusion on the initial
false premise that homosexuality is either abnormal or a mental
disorder.”119 Some commentators have interpreted the holding to
mean that the court determined homosexuality is not a disorder as
a matter of law.120 
Although the decision itself was limited to expert qualifications
in one state, the New Jersey Superior Court’s line of reasoning could
similarly be applied in consumer protection cases across the nation.
Both Frye and Daubert evidentiary jurisdictions are likely to follow
the Ferguson v. JONAH model,121 and if state courts have a history
of holding APA determinations in high regard when making legal
determinations, then the courts would likely have little choice but
to also find that homosexuality is not a disorder as a matter of
law.122 With so much evidence cutting against homosexuality being
a disorder, SOCE practitioners characterizing homosexuality
otherwise will likely be considered as providing deceptive represen-
tations. In that sense, SOCE practitioners are likely to stop defining
homosexuality as a disorder in order to avoid being labeled as
deceptive.
B. Ability to Alter Sexual Orientation
Although the assertion that homosexuality is a disorder would
rely on the same general facts in each case, each consumer protec-
tion case would be unique depending on the business practices of the
117. See id. 
118. See id. at *9.
119. Id. at *10.
120. See, e.g., Consumer Protection, supra note 4, at 133.
121. See Dubrowski, supra note 19, at 84 n.30. For a description of the importance of both
the Frye and Daubert evidentiary regimes, see Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye
or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 476-77
(2005). 
122. But see Ex parte H.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 35-36 (Ala. 2002) (Moore, C.J., specially
concurring) (stating that judges should not rely on the latest psychological studies, as such
studies are subject to bias and philosophical leanings). 
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defendant accused of misrepresenting their ability to alter sexual
orientation. While SOCE practitioners advertise and offer similar
services, they are far from a unified industry.123 Even the consumer-
plaintiffs in Ferguson v. JONAH acknowledged that they did not
intend to prove that all SOCE were ineffective.124 Instead, the
plaintiffs simply aimed to prove that the defendant’s programs
specifically were unable to alter sexual orientation, at least in
accordance with the statistics that the defendants provided.125 After
all, to have a successful claim, plaintiffs only need to prove the
specific SOCE advertised and offered by the practitioner-defendants
were unable to alter sexual orientation. 
In Ferguson v. JONAH, the New Jersey Superior Court disquali-
fied experts from testifying on the effectiveness of SOCE due to the
expert’s initial false belief that “homosexuality is abnormal or a
disorder that can be resolved through counseling.”126 The effective-
ness of sexual orientation alteration in Ferguson v. JONAH was
based on the idea that homosexuality was a disorder, and subse-
quent evidence on altered sexual orientation was therefore based on
an unreliable premise.127 However, other views of sexual orientation
exist that do not rely on homosexuality being a disorder, and
subscribing to such a theory while engaging in the business of SOCE
may offer different and more successful defenses for practitioner-
defendants to defend their services.
Practitioner-defendants will likely argue that even a minor
change in a patient’s sexual practices satisfies its representation
that SOCE effectively alters sexual orientation. Studies on sexuality
claim that sexual orientation can be determined in a variety of
ways, including sexual attraction, romantic attraction, sexual
behavior, and sexual identity.128 Given that sexual behavior is one
aspect of sexual orientation, practitioner-defendants may attempt
to claim that even small changes in sexual behavior validate the
123. See Haldeman, supra note 53, at 221. 
124. See Ferguson, 2015 WL 609436, at *2.
125. See id.
126. Id. at *10-11.
127. Id. at *10 (“One is inexorably tied to the other: [the experts] cannot explain their
clinical experience to the jury without also presenting their scientifically discredited belief
that homosexuality is abnormal or a mental disorder.”).
128. See Savin-Williams, supra note 54, at 7-9. 
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advertisements and promises of a change in sexual orientation. For
example, in Ferguson v. JONAH, the defendants unsuccessfully ar-
gued that former clients choosing not to act on homosexual desires
represented a change in sexual orientation.129 Such invocations are
likely to remain ineffective.130 Courts have generally held that con-
sumer protection laws are intended to truly protect consumers, and
representations that are “literally true does not mean they cannot
be misleading to the average consumer.”131 Consumer protection
laws aim to protect against misleading business practices, and so
practitioner-defendants will likely not be able to argue that a minor
literal truth justifies their business representations as legitimate.
In another strategy to prove that sexual orientation is alterable,
practitioner-defendants may try to argue that sexual orientation
itself is inherently fluid and can change over time. The extent to
which factors that make up sexual orientation are stable over time
is essentially unknown, especially regarding the biological basis
behind sexual orientation.132 Scientific studies show that the factors
used to determine sexual orientation have been noted to change
throughout an individual’s lifetime.133 If practitioner-defendants
have represented sexual orientation as described above, they may
have a better opportunity to prove that their methods can assist
clients in managing the potential fluidity of sexual orientation. Such
a representation would be different from the representations made
by the defendant-practitioner in Ferguson v. JONAH, as it would
focus more on management and less on a cure.134 While such a char-
acterization of sexuality would not be as hard of a stance against
homosexuality as previous incarnations of SOCE, such a stance may
129. See Consumer Protection, supra note 4, at 134.
130. See id.
131. Smajlaj v. Campbell Soup Co., 782 F. Supp. 2d 84, 98 (D.N.J. 2011).
132. See, e.g., Mark Joseph Stern, Born This Way?, SLATE (June 28, 2013, 5:45 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2013/06/biological_basis_for_homo
sexuality_the_fraternal_birth_order_explanation.html [https://perma.cc/ZZR5-D4NJ] (ac-
knowledging some biology behind sexual orientation, but noting that scientific research is
unlikely to “uncover a single biological basis for homosexuality”); Ed Yong, No, Scientists Have
Not Found the ‘Gay Gene,’ ATLANTIC (Oct. 10, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/science/
archive/2015/10/no-scientists-have-not-found-the-gay-gene/410059/ [https://perma.cc/W7MD-
7D4B] (acknowledging the difficulty in pinpointing a genome that causes homosexuality).
133. See Savin-Williams, supra note 54, at 11-12.
134. See Dubrowski, supra note 19, at 90 (noting that Ferguson v. JONAH focused on
curing homosexuality).
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allow SOCE to exist at some level so long as practitioners carefully
characterize their services to focus on the possible fluidity of sexual
orientation.
The Supreme Court may have dealt a blow to the argument that
sexual orientation is alterable at all in its Obergefell v. Hodges
decision, which legalized same-sex marriage.135 Writing for the
majority, Justice Kennedy referred to the petitioners, a same-sex
couple seeking to marry in Ohio, as having an “immutable nature”
that made same-sex marriage their only path to marriage.136 With
the Supreme Court seemingly acknowledging the immutability of
sexual orientation, arguments that sexual orientation is unalterable
may strengthen consumer-plaintiffs’ arguments when challenging
SOCE in consumer protection claims. However, the impact of
Obergefell’s reference to the immutability of sexual orientation
outside the realm of constitutional analysis remains to be seen.
III. ACCOUNTING FOR DIFFERENCES IN STATE CONSUMER
PROTECTION LAWS
While a practitioner’s representations serve as the cornerstone for
a consumer protection claim against SOCE, consumer protection
laws have a variety of other requirements that consumer-plaintiffs
must also meet. This Part focuses on three major requirements:
Section A explains how the SOCE in question must fall within the
scope of states’ consumer protection law, Section B describes differ-
ent states’ intent requirements, and Section C describes different
states’ reliance requirements. Section D explains the challenges of
state consumer protection laws that require the state government
to initiate lawsuits against deceptive trade practices.
135. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). 
136. Id. at 2594; see also Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2, 23-27
(2015) (explaining how immutability has been applied in the constitutional context). Before
the Obergefell decision, circuit courts had also acknowledged that sexual orientation was
likely immutable. See, e.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 657 (7th Cir. 2014).
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A. Differing Scopes of State Consumer Protection Laws
Before delving into different types of state consumer protection
laws, a plaintiff ’s claim must first fall within the scope of the applic-
able state consumer protection law. Consumer protection statutes
are considered to be neutral and generally applicable, allowing
many consumer-business transactions to fall within their scope.137
However, different state laws have their limits on what activities
they can regulate, and the same is true for SOCE: not all types of
SOCE may be reached by consumer protection laws.
First, the SOCE transaction in question must be defined as a
consumer-business transaction in order to be covered by consumer
protection laws. In interpreting which types of transactions are
subject to consumer protection, courts have looked to the general
purpose of the laws, which intended for consumer protection to
apply when the transaction at question is for business and not gra-
tuity.138 Straightforwardly put, a relationship must exist between
the plaintiff as a consumer and the defendant as a products dealer
or services provider. Generally applied, charitable transactions and
transactions between relatives or friends likely would not be subject
to consumer protection laws. Therefore, any type of SOCE that is
provided without any payment is unlikely to fall within the scope of
consumer protection laws, leaving the subject of the SOCE with no
action under the title of consumer protection.139
Second, some states have carved out certain exempt professions
in their consumer protection laws, thus making certain profession-
als nearly untouchable in this area of litigation.140 Twenty-two
states have exempted at least one type of profession from its con-
sumer protection laws.141 However, not all of the exempt professions
could feasibly include SOCE practitioners. Exempt group member-
137. See Am. Target Advert., Inc. v. Giani, 199 F.3d 1241, 1247 (10th Cir. 2000); Kate
Maternowski, Note, The Commercial Speech Doctrine Barely Survives Sorrell, 38 J.C. & U.L.
629, 650 (2012). 
138. See, e.g., Word of Faith World Outreach Ctr. Church, Inc. v. Morales, 787 F. Supp. 689,
696-97 (W.D. Tex. 1992), rev’d on other grounds, 986 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1993). 
139. For a discussion of the lack of liability for religious institutions under consumer
protection law, see infra Part IV.B.2.
140. See Mark D. Bauer, The Licensed Professional Exemption in Consumer Protection: At
Odds with Antitrust History and Precedent, 73 TENN. L. REV. 131, 154 (2006).
141. Id. at 155-63.
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ships that SOCE practitioners may be able to claim include
doctors,142 medical practitioners or health care providers,143 learned
professionals,144 professional service providers,145 and professionals
whose practices are regulated under state law.146 While the
aforementioned titles may be legal terms of art, state licensure
boards determine which exemptions apply to certain types of practi-
tioners.147 Additionally, by focusing on the advertising of SOCE
instead of the actual services, plaintiffs still may be able to bring
claims against the SOCE practitioners, as certain professionals are
only exempt if the act in question falls within the scope of their
professional, licensed capacity.148 For example, New Jersey has a
learned professional exemption,149 but the plaintiffs in Ferguson v.
JONAH focused on advertising in their claim,150 which falls outside
the potential scope of actions covered by the “learned professional”
exemption.151 Therefore, even if practitioner-defendants attempt to
gain an exemption from consumer protection laws, consumer-
plaintiffs can avoid this exception by focusing on advertising to
ensure SOCE claims fall within the scope of their state’s consumer
protection laws. 
B. The Element of Intent and Genuine Belief
Intent requirements vary greatly across different states’ consum-
er protection laws. Generally, and contrary to common law fraud or
misrepresentation, many states do not require a plaintiff to prove
142. See, e.g., Quimby v. Fine, 724 P.2d 403, 406 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986). 
143. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. COM. LAW § 13-104 (West 2016); Ott v. Baker, 53 Va. Cir.
113, 115 (2000).
144. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (2016); Macedo v. Dello Russo, 840 A.2d 238, 242
(N.J. 2004).
145. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.49(c) (West 2016).
146. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 754(2) (2016). 
147. See, e.g., Nadia N. Sawicki, Character, Competence, and the Principles of Medical
Discipline, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 285, 286 (2010). 
148. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.49(c); Macedo, 840 A.2d at 242 (allowing
exemptions for professionals “so long as they are operating in their professional capacities”). 
149. Macedo, 840 A.2d at 242. 
150. See Ferguson v. JONAH, No. HUD-L-5473-12, 2015 WL 609436, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. Feb. 5, 2015).
151. See Macedo, 840 A.2d at 242.
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the defendant’s intent to deceive in a consumer protection claim.152
While the lack of an intent requirement may result in defendants
being held liable for even innocent misrepresentations, the general
purpose of consumer protection laws is to protect the public and not
necessarily to punish the wrongdoer.153 The lack of an intent
element reflects such a purpose. As an Ohio appeals court succinctly
stated, “‘the very reason for the enactment of the [Ohio law] was to
give the consumer protection from a supplier’s deceptions which he
lacked under the common law’ [and] to require proof of intent to
deceive would ‘effectively emasculate the act and contradict its
fundamental purpose.’”154
When some type of intent is required for a practitioner-defendant
to be liable, a consumer protection claim against SOCE becomes
more difficult. Two major types of intent may be required in differ-
ent consumer protection laws: either an intent to deceive or an in-
tent that the consumer rely on the deceptive act.155 For an intent to
deceive, some states explicitly require by statute that defendants act
willfully, knowingly, or intentionally in practicing deceptive acts in
order to be liable under consumer protection laws.156 Other states
have read intent into their consumer protection laws, with state
courts interpreting consumer law to mean that defendants must
have acted with an intent to deceive consumers.157 Similarly, some
other states require defendants to intend for consumers to rely on
their actions, not be deceived by their actions.158 
152. See PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 27, § 3.2; Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 38,
at 20.
153. See PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 27, § 3.2.
154. Id. (quoting Thomas v. Sun Furniture & Appliance Co., 399 N.E.2d 567, 570 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1978)).
155. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 38, at 20. Some states require a degree of in-
tent only when the defendant is alleged to have omitted or concealed material facts. See, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471(12) (2016) (requiring a knowing intent for omissions); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 44-1522(A) (2016) (requiring an intent that consumers rely on an omission).
However, as this Note explores affirmative misrepresentations of SOCE practitioners, these
intent requirements will not be analyzed.
156. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 646.605(10) (2016) (willfully); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-24-
6(1) (2016) (knowingly); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-4(2) (West 2016) (knowingly or
intentionally).
157. See, e.g., Dix v. Am. Bankers Life Assurance Co., 415 N.W.2d 206, 209 (Mich. 1987)
(requiring an “intent to deceive”).
158. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-15-02 (2016) (statutorily requiring an intent for
consumers to rely on action); Nilsson v. NBD Bank of Ill., 731 N.E.2d 774, 784 (Ill. App. Ct.
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With practitioner-defendants being required to have an intent to
deceive consumers in some states, consumer-plaintiffs have a higher
bar in structuring consumer protection claims compared to states
that do not require intent at all. After all, SOCE practitioners that
genuinely advertise and offer services in the belief that their brand
of SOCE alters sexual orientation would seemingly be free of liabil-
ity under those consumer protection laws.159 Such concerns are well
warranted; others have also acknowledged the difficulty of intent
requirements in structuring a consumer protection claim.160 New
Jersey’s consumer protection law did not contain an intent require-
ment, and so a genuine belief problem was not put to the test in
Ferguson v. JONAH.161 Moving beyond Ferguson v. JONAH, SOCE
practitioners are sure to rely on a state’s intent requirement if
available. 
However, the difficulties posed by the intent requirements are not
insurmountable, especially if SOCE practitioners offer services un-
der a state professional license. As professionals dealing with coun-
seling and similar services, SOCE practitioners may be required to
know and act within what a reasonable similar practitioner would
do in similar circumstances.162 Therefore, SOCE practitioners are
expected to have the knowledge that SOCE have generally been
proven ineffective, or at least should be knowledgeable of such
information. Representing such services without regard to the
reputation of ineffectiveness may result in SOCE practitioners’ ac-
tions satisfying the intent requirement of consumer protection laws. 
Further, despite the intent requirements, state courts have still
seemed willing to interpret the consumer protection laws favorably
for consumer-plaintiffs. For example, New Mexico’s consumer pro-
tection law requires a defendant to act knowingly in order for an ac-
tion to be defined as deceptive.163 However, New Mexico state courts
still allow consumer protection claims to proceed even without an
1999) (reading an intent for consumers to rely on action into state consumer protection law).
159. For a discussion of SOCE practitioners that offer services on the basis of their
religious beliefs, see infra Part IV.B.1.
160. See Dubrowski, supra note 19, at 94-95.
161. See id. at 90.
162. See Thomas L. Hafemeister et al., Parity at a Price: The Emerging Professional
Liability of Mental Health Providers, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29, 52 (2013). 
163. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2(D) (West 2016).
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intent to deceive, stating that if a pure intent completely protected
plaintiffs, then the consumer protection act would become “tooth-
less.”164 The willingness of some courts to view laws in light of their
consumer-friendly purpose gives consumer-plaintiffs a reason for
optimism, even if a state maintains an intent requirement in its
antideception aspect of consumer protection law.
C. The Element of Reliance
While proving actual reliance was a staple of common law fraud,
state consumer protection laws fall in one of two camps: they either
maintain the common law requirement of actual reliance or have
eliminated the need for a consumer-plaintiff to show actual reliance.
A small minority of states, made up of Indiana, Texas, and Wyo-
ming, have explicitly maintained actual reliance as a requirement
in the language of their consumer protection acts.165 While not
explicitly utilizing the term “reliance,” Kansas courts have read the
requirement of actual reliance into the term “aggrieved” in its
consumer protection law.166 Other states’ courts read the common
law definition of reliance into their consumer protection laws, there-
fore also requiring some type of actual reliance for a successful
consumer protection claim, whether reasonable reliance or not.167 To
meet the actual reliance requirement, consumer-plaintiffs must be
able to show that their reliance on SOCE practitioners’ deceptive
representations resulted in their damages.168
Consumer-plaintiffs can straightforwardly argue that their dam-
ages at question are the cost of the treatments and that the promise
to rid the consumer-plaintiffs of same-sex attraction caused them to
pay the money in the first place. For example, the plaintiffs in
Ferguson v. JONAH sought the restitution of money paid to JONAH
164. See Ashlock v. Sunwest Bank of Roswell, N.A., 753 P.2d 346, 348 (N.M. 1988), over-
ruled on other grounds by Gonzales v. Surgidev Corp., 899 P.2d 576 (N.M. 1995). 
165. See IND. CODE § 24-5-0.5-4(a) (2016); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(1)(B)
(West 2016); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-108(a) (2016).
166. See Finstad v. Washburn Univ. of Topeka, 845 P.2d 685, 691-92 (Kan. 1993).
167. See, e.g., Parks v. Macro-Dynamics, Inc., 591 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979);
Lynas v. Williams, 454 S.E.2d 570, 574 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). 
168. See, e.g., Parks, 591 P.2d at 1008.
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for its services.169 The plaintiffs paid JONAH in reliance on JO-
NAH’s promise to alter their sexual orientation, and so JONAH’s
misrepresentations resulted in the damages.170 Similar transactions
would likely be replicated in other cases of paid-for SOCE services.
Instead of requiring a consumer-plaintiff to show actual reliance,
most other states merely require a showing that the act has a
tendency or a capacity to mislead consumers.171 Notably, courts in
states that do not require actual reliance typically consider all levels
of consumers, including the unsophisticated and the reasonable,
when making a determination on the tendency or capacity of a
business practice to mislead.172 Some states’ courts have developed
such a formulation by relying on federal cases evaluating FTC
practices, finding the same motivation behind state consumer acts
as the federal regulations.173 Such reliance is easy to meet, as
consumers generally are considered to rely on all statements of
commercial dealers.174
D. A Note on State-Brought Consumer Protection Claims
While the ability of a private plaintiff to bring suit against a
business serves as a key advantage for plaintiffs in state consumer
protection laws, states are able to bring actions against deceptive
businesses as well. However, a state-brought consumer protection
claim may bring its own set of complications, especially if the state-
brought claim is against a SOCE practitioner. 
First, not all states allow a private plaintiff to bring antideception
consumer protection claims. Iowa, Mississippi, and Texas do not
allow consumers to bring actions against deceptive acts, even
169. See Ferguson v. JONAH, No. HUD-L-5473-12, 2015 WL 609436, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. Feb. 5, 2015).
170. See id.
171. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 38, at 19. At least three states have not clearly
established whether reliance is a requirement for private consumer protection actions at all.
Id. 
172. See, e.g., Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 372 N.E.2d 17, 19 (N.Y. 1977) (“We do not look
to the average customer but to ... the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous.”).
173. See, e.g., Kugler v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 293 A.2d 682 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1972) (“Laws are made to protect the trusting as well as the suspicious.” (quoting Goodman
v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584, 603 (9th Cir. 1957))).
174. See PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 27, § 3:4.
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though Mississippi and Texas allow consumers to bring claims un-
der other aspects of their consumer protection laws.175 This limita-
tion significantly harms the enforcement of the antideception aspect
of consumer protection laws, as consumers must gather some level
of state approval of their complaint before taking legal action. In the
controversial field of SOCE, consumer-plaintiffs may have difficulty
convincing state offices to approve of their lawsuit claims, let alone
pursue them. States that do not allow consumers to initiate
antideception suits do grant them the opportunity to file formal
consumer complaints, although such filings seem to be the limit for
consumer action without state action.176 
When a state enforcement agency brings a consumer protection
claim, the agency generally must additionally demonstrate that the
suit will serve the public interest.177 The basis for a public interest
requirement comes from a theory of incentivizing a state agency to
make wise use of its resources to ensure that its consumer protec-
tion claims truly help consumers.178 However, six states have
extended the public interest requirement to private consumers as
well.179 
What exactly satisfies the public interest requirement varies from
state to state.180 States typically require some type of factored test
to prove public interest, whether implied by statute or created
completely by the state judiciary.181 As seen by comparing both Col-
orado’s consumer protection law as interpreted by state courts with
175. See IOWA CODE § 714.16(7) (2016); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 75-24-21 (2016); TEX. BUS. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 17.48 (West 2016).
176. See Consumer Protection Complaint Form, OFF. ATT’Y GEN.: ST. MISS., http://www.ago.
state.ms.us/forms/consumer-protection-complaint-form/ [https://perma.cc/PR6H-VNBT]; File
a Consumer Complaint, ATT’Y GEN. TEX., https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/cpd/file-a-
consumer-complaint [https://perma.cc/BUK9-RA9F]; File a Consumer Complaint, IOWA DEP’T
JUST.: OFF. ATT’Y GEN., https://www.iowaattorneygeneral.gov/for-consumers/file-a-consumer-
complaint/ [https://perma.cc/9UH2-6NQ5].
177. See PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 27, § 5.5. Some have referred to this as a “public
impact” requirement. See, e.g., Dubrowski, supra note 19, at 95.
178. See PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 27, § 5.5.
179. Id. (listing Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Nebraska, Washington, and South
Carolina as requiring private plaintiffs to show that their suit will serve the public interest).
180. See Dubrowski, supra note 19, at 95.
181. See Martinez v. Lewis, 969 P.2d 213, 222 (Colo. 1998) (en banc) (explaining Colorado’s
statutory public interest requirement); Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title
Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 531, 537 (Wash. 1986) (en banc) (explaining Washington’s judge-made
public interest requirement).
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Washington’s court-created public interest requirement, a public
interest can generally be proven when deceptive business practices
affect multiple consumers, occur multiples times, and could continue
into the future.182 When applying this general formulation of the
public interest requirement to claims against SOCE practitioners,
the public interest requirement seems most likely to be satisfied
when a practitioner is actively advertising SOCE within a commu-
nity or online and offering SOCE to multiple clients. If taking
advantage of public interest requirements, SOCE practitioners may
attempt to move to a more direct, one-on-one solicitation of SOCE
clients. This would, of course, limit the pervasiveness and publicity
of SOCE, but would more than likely be for naught, as such targeted
business transactions would still be actionable by private plaintiffs
in the vast majority of states.
IV. RESPONDING TO POTENTIAL FIRST AMENDMENT DEFENSES
The aforementioned requirements of a consumer protection claim
are merely part of any lawsuit against SOCE practitioners. While
some legal arguments exist that may be supportive of practitioner-
defendants in consumer protection claims, SOCE practitioners have
also demonstrated a willingness to challenge the constitutionality
of laws that hinder their SOCE practices.183 This Part describes the
First Amendment defenses that SOCE practitioners will likely
assert in an attempt to gain constitutional protection for SOCE
practices, with Section A first describing freedom of speech, and
Section B then describing freedom of religion. 
A. The Likely Inapplicability of Freedom of Speech Defenses
SOCE practitioners have furthered freedom of speech arguments
against laws that limit SOCE by focusing mainly on talk therapy,
a type of SOCE administered completely through verbal commun-
182. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-1102 (2016), and Martinez, 969 P.2d at 222, with
Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc., 719 P.2d at 537.
183. See King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 220 (3d Cir. 2014); Pickup v. Brown, 740
F.3d 1208, 1221 (9th Cir. 2013).
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ication.184 SOCE practitioners have argued that laws hindering their
ability to communicate freely and openly with clients via “talk
therapy” unconstitutionally limit their freedom of speech as profes-
sionals.185 Practitioners have been met with conflicting responses to
their freedom of speech claims, but all decisions have resulted in the
same denial of First Amendment infringement. In Pickup v. Brown,
for example, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with practitioners and held
that a SOCE ban for minors limited conduct, not speech, therefore
not infringing on the First Amendment speech rights of SOCE
practitioners.186 The Pickup ruling was the first one to involve a
court labeling the activities that take place during SOCE, an
important determination for a First Amendment ruling.187 In King
v. Governor of New Jersey, a case involving a SOCE ban for minors
similar to Pickup, the Third Circuit disagreed with the Ninth
Circuit and determined the law regulated professional speech, not
conduct, and was subject to some degree of First Amendment
protection.188 However, the Third Circuit acknowledged that
professional speech had a diminished level of First Amendment
protection, and because the SOCE ban for minors advanced a
substantial state interest, the law was held constitutional.189
The First Amendment speech status of SOCE practices like talk
therapy has been hotly debated outside of the courtroom. Some
agree that healthcare treatments such as SOCE represent conduct,
not speech, and deserve no First Amendment protection.190 Others
predict that anti-SOCE laws do implicate the First Amendment and
will be unable to pass heightened levels of constitutional scrutiny.191
Some are more generally concerned as to the categorization of
184. See King, 767 F.3d at 224.
185. See id.
186. See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1222.
187. See William Travis, Case Note, Bad Medicine: The Ninth Circuit Reviews Issues of Free
Speech, Professional Regulations, and California’s Ban on Sexual Orientation Change Efforts
in Pickup v. Brown, 23 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 191, 191-92 (2014).
188. See King, 767 F.3d at 224. 
189. See id.
190. See, e.g., Nick Clair, Chapter 835: “Gay Conversion Therapy” Ban: Protecting Children
or Infringing Rights?, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 550, 557 (2013).
191. See, e.g., Megan E. McCormick, Note, The Freedom to Be “Converted”?: An Analysis
of the First Amendment Implications of Laws Banning Sexual Orientation Change Efforts, 48
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 171, 202 (2015). 
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speech for therapeutic professionals.192 Yet, at least one assertion is
clearly true: the First Amendment questions surrounding therapist-
patient communications are unsettled.193 Thankfully, the speech in
question in a consumer protection action is not as muddled as the
speech in question from a law that directly bans SOCE practices. In
fact, the uncertainty of the First Amendment on laws banning
SOCE outright has led to the suggestion to SOCE opponents that
they focus on “anti-deception statutes of general applicability” in-
stead of outright bans.194 Antideception consumer protection laws fit
this proposal.195
Consumer protection laws have already proved their constitu-
tional muster under challenges to commercial speech.196 With con-
sumer protection claims against SOCE practitioners focusing on the
deceptive nature of SOCE advertising and not the actual speech
between therapists and patients, the consumer protection laws
likely avoid the still-unclear area of talk therapy First Amendment
jurisprudence altogether.
B. Freedom of Religion: A Consumer-Plaintiff’s Greatest
Challenge
When utilizing religious freedom defenses, practitioner-defen-
dants have two pathways to validate their SOCE practices. First,
192. See, e.g., Warren Geoffrey Tucker, Note, It’s Not Called Conduct Therapy; Talk
Therapy as a Protected Form of Speech Under the First Amendment, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 885, 886 (2015). 
193. See Clay Calvert et al., Conversion Therapy and Free Speech: A Doctrinal and
Theoretical First Amendment Analysis, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & LAW 525, 571 (2014)
(noting that conversion therapy and free speech is “an issue that easily could, given its
controversial nature, work its way up to the nation’s high court”). But see Christian S.
Cyphers, Banning Sexual Orientation Therapy: Constitutionally Supported and Socially
Necessary, 35 J. LEGAL MED. 539, 540 (2014) (arguing that SOCE bans are clearly
constitutional).
194. See Victor, supra note 18, at 1537, 1562-64. 
195. See id. at 1563-64 (focusing primarily on professional codes of conduct, but acknowl-
edging consumer protection laws as “wide-ranging anti-deception regulation”). 
196. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
563 (1980) (“The government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the
public than to inform it.”); see also Shawn L. Fultz, Comment, If It Quacks Like a Duck:
Reviewing Health Care Providers’ Speech Restrictions Under the First Prong of Central
Hudson, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 567, 587 (2013) (stating that commercial speech limitations on
deceptive or misleading speech for professionals must satisfy rational basis review).
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this Section discusses how SOCE practitioners may be able to rely
on their religious beliefs to avoid liability under consumer protection
laws, and then this Section explains how practitioners can use the
protection awarded to religious institutions to provide SOCE.
1. Religious Beliefs of SOCE Practitioners
The practitioner-defendants in Ferguson v. JONAH believed that
homosexuality was a learned behavior and that homosexuality could
be reduced or eliminated through psychological and spiritual help.197
Such a belief may be scientifically untrue, as sexual orientation may
be a completely immutable characteristic.198 But what if SOCE
practitioners truly believe that certain SOCE, particularly spiritual
therapy, can alter sexual orientation? Some argue that in order to
be liable for fraud, one must know that the services he or she
provides do not result in the promised results.199 This definition is
frustrated in the world of spiritual services, in which practitioners
sincerely believe in the ability of the services they offer.200 Analo-
gized to SOCE, a practitioner’s sincere beliefs may not be half-baked
assertions to avoid liability in a consumer protection claim, but
instead deeply held convictions that become a vital part of the
consumer transaction.
With the passage of the federal Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA), a new body of law developed in the United States
surrounding the ability of private citizens to invoke freedom of
religion defenses when noncompliant with the law.201 The existence
of such law provides the possibility that SOCE practitioners could
defend themselves against consumer protection claims by arguing
that consumer protection laws substantially burden their free
exercise of religion, with the exercise in question being the ability
197. See Ferguson v. JONAH, No. HUD-L-5473-12, 2015 WL 609436, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. Feb. 5, 2015).
198. See supra Part II.B.
199. See Jonathan Bolton, Between the Quack and the Fanatic: Movements in Our Self-
Belief, 14 MED. HEALTH CARE & PHIL. 281, 282 (2011).
200. See Amanda van Eck Duymaer van Twist, Introduction to MINORITY RELIGIONS AND
FRAUD: IN GOOD FAITH (Amanda van Eck Duymaer van Twist ed., 2014) (ebook); Bolton, supra
note 199, at 282-83. 
201. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512-16 (1997).
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and right to alter sexual orientation through spiritual means. With
its broad application, RFRA’s protections apply not only to persons,
but also corporations, companies, associations, societies, and similar
entities.202 However, the federal RFRA is limited because it does not
apply to state and local governments.203
The applicability of RFRA laws, however, does not stop at the
federal level. As of February 2016, nineteen states had adopted laws
based on the federal RFRA, creating state RFRAs.204 The purpose of
many state RFRAs has been to apply a stronger version of the
federal RFRA to citizens of those states, so that state governments
may substantially burden a right to free exercise of religion only if
the regulation furthers a compelling state interest and utilizes the
least restrictive means available.205 Despite the potential applicabil-
ity of state RFRAs to consumer protection claims against SOCE,
state RFRA cases have been small in number, and the true impact
of such laws is largely left to be seen.206 With state RFRAs getting
a lot of media attention on issues affecting gay, lesbian, and bisex-
ual individuals,207 SOCE practitioners are likely to attempt to use
the defenses when available.
In states without RFRA laws, though, commercial and profes-
sional groups that subscribe to views against homosexuality and
provide SOCE seem to have little First Amendment protection from
consumer protection laws. Courts have found that laws directly ban-
ning SOCE for minors were constitutional for being neutral, gener-
ally applicable, and rationally related to a legitimate government
202. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
203. See Mary L. Topliff, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000bb et seq.), 135 A.L.R. Fed. 121 § 3 (2015). 
204. See Jordan Mathews, Comment, State RFRAs: Trust Judges to Strike the Proper
Balance Between Religious Freedom and Anti-Discrimination Law, 85 MISS. L.J. SUPRA
(forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 14), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2558835 [https://perma.cc/JVX5-9EMU].
205. See Brian L. Porto, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Operation of State
Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, 116 A.L.R. 5th 233 § 2 (2004). 
206. An in-depth analysis of state RFRA applicability is outside the scope of this Note. For
a general discussion of state RFRA applicability, see Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty
After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466, 479-82 (2010).
207. See, e.g., Tom Davies, Indiana Officials Look to Stem Religious Objections Fallout,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 28, 2015, 3:36 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/5c0770a9256e4dca
98c4c569f62f44db/indiana-officials-look-stem-religious-objections-fallout [https://perma.cc/
6YL4-BSC4].
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objective.208 If a law specifically targeting SOCE practices can
survive constitutional scrutiny, then neutral consumer protection
laws likely will as well.
2. The Immunity of Religious Institutions
In the United States, religious institutions have long opposed
homosexual behavior as morally wrong.209 With the ability to point
to religious texts that decry homosexuality,210 religious groups have
influenced the continuation of SOCE and still have great interest in
continuing to ensure the availability of SOCE practices.211 In the
wake of Ferguson v. JONAH, opponents of SOCE have acknowl-
edged that applying consumer protection laws to religious institu-
tions will be a challenge, and they expect SOCE practitioners to “be
forced to operate through churches and other religious institutions”
and to rely on religious freedom legal defenses.212
While commercial SOCE practitioners who hold certain religious
beliefs may be found liable for deceptive trade practices under
consumer protection laws, religious groups offering SOCE are likely
to be completely protected from any claim under consumer protec-
tion laws. To demonstrate this point, one must look to case law in
which religious institutions have been challenged under any type of
fraud law. Most notably, the Fifth Circuit’s Word of Faith World
Outreach Center Church, Inc. v. Morales decision involved a Texas
church being publicly accused in a media exposé of falsely represent-
ing its charitable endeavors, despite its supporters and members
having sent it $65 million in one year.213 The accusation resulted in
the Texas Office of the Attorney General demanding documents
from the church pursuant to Texas’s consumer protection law.214 The
208. See King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 241-43 (3d Cir. 2014). 
209. Jonathan Sacks, New Development, “Pray Away the Gay?” An Analysis of the Legality
of Conversion Therapy by Homophobic Religious Organizations, 13 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION
67, 71 (2011). 
210. See, e.g., Leviticus 18:22 (“You shall not lie with a male as one lies with a female; it
is an abomination.”).
211. See Sacks, supra note 209, at 72.
212. Khazan, supra note 5.
213. 986 F.2d 962, 963-64 (5th Cir. 1993).
214. Id. at 964. Despite the Word of Faith case not being brought by a private consumer-
plaintiff, it still serves as a strong illustration of the problems in bringing consumer protection
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church refused to provide the documents, and the Attorney General
then filed a petition to compel the church to provide the requested
documents.215 In response, the church filed its own federal lawsuit,
aiming to assert its own rights and privileges as a church against
the state’s legal action.216
The district court issued two holdings that ruled in favor of the
church and halted the Texas consumer protection law from applying
to religious institutions. First, the court held that religious institu-
tions did not fall within the scope of the Texas consumer protection
law.217 Second, the court stated that even if the church was subject
to the Texas consumer protection law, the law could not constitu-
tionally be applied to the church.218 While an appeals court on
review stated that the district court’s rulings were unnecessary and
reversed and remanded the case for other reasons,219 the district
court’s reasoning for its rulings is important to understanding the
applicability of consumer protection laws to religious institutions.
First, the Word of Faith decision illustrates that consumer
protection laws are limited to business transactions,220 and courts
have been reluctant to define church relationships with parishioners
as business transactions. With the Word of Faith Church operating
as a nonprofit institution providing religious services and its donors
offering gratuitous donations, the church could not be subject to the
consumer protection law.221 Despite its reversal, the appeals court
agreed with the district court that “it is highly likely” that Texas’s
consumer protection statute does not apply to the church, but urged
that the application of Texas’s consumer protection law was to be
determined by the Texas courts.222
While the first Word of Faith decision did not even result in bind-
ing case law in the Fifth Circuit due to the reversal, its first holding
spells trouble for the ability to bring a consumer protection claim
claims against religious institutions.
215. Id. 
216. Word of Faith World Outreach Ctr. Church, Inc. v. Morales, 787 F. Supp. 689, 692
(W.D. Tex. 1992), rev’d, 986 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1993).
217. Id. at 696.
218. Id. at 698.
219. Word of Faith, 986 F.2d at 968-70.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 138-39.
221. See Word of Faith, 787 F. Supp. at 697. 
222. See Word of Faith, 986 F.2d at 968. 
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against a church for the services it provides, such as church-
provided SOCE. Imagine a church and its religious officers provide
SOCE as a religious service to its parishioners at no cost. Under the
reasoning in Word of Faith, as long as a church’s SOCE does not
resemble a business transaction and is offered gratuitously, a con-
sumer protection claim against the church would not succeed, even
if the church-provided SOCE meets the deceptive and harmful
elements of a consumer protection claim.
The Word of Faith district court’s religious freedom holding fur-
ther illustrates problems for consumer protection actions against
religious institutions. The district court held that the Texas consum-
er protection proceedings against the church fostered “an excessive
government entanglement with religion.”223 The district court looked
not at the initial legal action brought under the Texas consumer
protection law itself, but at its potential “end result”: an injunction
against the church providing the deceptive practice and the continu-
al oversight of church activities.224 Because the “end result” of
actions under the Texas consumer protection law would result in
oversight and excessive government entanglement, the church could
not constitutionally be held liable under the Texas consumer
protection law.225 
Although the appeals court did not state an official opinion on the
district court’s findings on First Amendment protections of the
church,226 the district court was not the first court to find consumer
laws inapplicable to religious institutions due to excessive govern-
ment entanglement.227 Even though the Word of Faith case was
brought by the state attorney general’s office, thirty-three states
allow private consumer-plaintiffs to bring actions similar to those
of the state attorneys general, meaning that injunctive relief is
223. See Word of Faith, 787 F. Supp. at 701 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
612-13 (1971)). 
224. See id. at 701-02. 
225. See id. at 702.
226. Word of Faith, 986 F.2d at 968 (“We venture no opinion as to the correctness of the
district court’s decision on the constitutional merits.”).
227. See Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73, 78-79 (1st Cir. 1979) (finding
Puerto Rico’s Department of Consumer Affairs’ investigations into Catholic schools to
represent excessive government entanglement); see also Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S.
664, 674-75 (1970) (describing excessive government entanglement in relation to determining
the tax-exempt status of churches).
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available should the plaintiffs succeed.228 In light of court decisions
such as Word of Faith, consumer protection laws are generally
considered to infringe unconstitutionally on religious freedom.
Therefore, even if church-provided SOCE is part of a consumer-
business transaction, practitioner-defendants likely remain un-
touchable due to churches’ religious freedom rights.229
CONCLUSION
A viable path exists for individuals harmed by SOCE to bring
consumer protection claims against the practitioners who have
provided damaging SOCE services. After all, the result of the
Ferguson v. JONAH case speaks for itself. However, the path is not
so straightforward. Moving forward from Ferguson v. JONAH,
SOCE practitioners are likely to adapt their practices in three major
ways. First, SOCE practitioners may begin to advertise and repre-
sent their services in different ways, taking advantage of the
unclear status of sexual orientation and avoiding the “deceptive
trade practice” label. Second, SOCE practitioners can generate legal
arguments that apply to other aspects of state consumer protection
laws that were not applicable in New Jersey, particularly intent and
reliance. Third, SOCE practitioners can create the greatest obstacle
of all if they are able to avail themselves to religious protections.
State RFRA protections may help individual practitioners, and the
First Amendment insulates religious institutions from any liability.
Ultimately, the challenges are not insurmountable, and Ferguson
v. JONAH may certainly be replicated to some extent nationwide.
With consumer protection laws offering a viable path forward for
former SOCE patients to bring claims against practitioners, the
228. See, e.g, HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-13(b)(2) (2016); PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 27,
§ 6.9.
229. In a unique case from Florida, a state appeals court allowed an antideception consum-
er protection claim to proceed against a defendant invoking a religious freedom defense. See
State v. Jackson, 576 So. 2d 864, 864-65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). Jackson, however, does not
necessarily impact consumer protection laws as applied to established religious institutions,
as the defendant was a self-proclaimed reverend who mailed solicitations promising to provide
winning lottery numbers “revealed to him by God” to those who sent him money. See id. The
court’s reasoning seemed to be underlined by the court’s concern with the overtly fraudulent
nature of the solicitations and the court’s minimal belief in the sincerity of the defendant’s
asserted religious beliefs. See id. at 868 (Gersten, J., specially concurring).
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practice of SOCE may be reduced in the coming years. But the
availability of consumer protection actions are far from a guarantee
to eradicate SOCE altogether. After all, SOCE practitioners may not
be able to alter sexual orientation, but they are certainly able to
alter the way they represent SOCE.
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